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Abstract Reports show that it is necessary to control
greenhouse gas emissions from the supply chain perspec-
tive. Numerous authors have already started quantifying
the impacts of emission trading on supply chain perfor-
mance in terms of cost and emissions. However, rare effort
is made to conceptualize this implementation. This paper
generates firstly one conceptual framework for supply
chain emission trading through a review of previous work
and then asserts how practically it could work out. In
addition, the risks confronted by firms and supply chains
under emission trading are identified considering each step
involved in the framework. These risks are further classi-
fied based on the concept of supply chain risks. Results
show that the implementation of emission trading on sup-
ply chain would raise additional risks into existing supply
chain risk portfolio. At last, this paper provides some risk
mitigation measures for those identified risks.
Keywords Emission trading  Supply chain greenhouse
gas emissions  Risk analysis  Supply chain emission
trading
1 Introduction
In order to be prepared for future environmental regula-
tions and to improve market competitiveness, companies
are realizing that they have to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from a supply chain perspective. Supply
chain GHG emissions account for around 75 % of the
whole GHG emissions from an industry sector, while
companies’ direct GHG emissions average only 14 % of
their supply chain GHG emissions prior to use and disposal
across all industries [1]. The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) [2] released one report certi-
fying that managing supply chain GHG emissions can
effectively avoid exposure to lack of preparedness for
complying with carbon regulations. In fact, numerous firms
from the electronic industry (i.e., HP and DELL) and retail
industry (i.e., Walmart) have already devoted themselves to
voluntary supply chain GHG emissions reduction pro-
grams. Although there is so far no policy targeted on
supply chain GHG emissions reduction, researchers have
recognized that companies in pursuit of green supply chain
strategies could leverage the opportunities offered by
market-based instruments such as emission trading. Gupta
and Palsule-Desai [3] mention that considering the social
cost of carbon emissions in greening supply chain is one of
future research opportunities. Long and Young [4] study
intervention options to enhance the management of supply
chain GHG emissions in the UK. They clarify supply chain
tax, emission trading, and credit schemes as economic
instruments among others to control supply chain
emissions.
The general principle of emission trading is giving a
limit, also called ‘cap’ on the overall amount of GHG
emissions [5]. Initial permits under this cap are allocated to
firms. One permit gives a right to emit one unit of GHG
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emissions. At the end of a certain period, emission pro-
ducers have to surrender permits in equivalent to their
accurate emissions. Entities subject to emission trading are
allowed to exchange permits via carbon markets with a
certain price as needed. The price of permits is theoreti-
cally decided by the demand and supply in the market but
also aligned to government regulation.
Employing emission trading in the context of supply
chain limits the overall supply chain GHG emissions and
provides flexible compliances for companies to meet their
targets. Hence, it is considered as one of the most cost-
effective instruments to control supply chain GHG emis-
sions. However, by limiting the GHG emissions from dif-
ferent companies under one common amount, it put supply
chain companies in front of new risks emerging from
sources that are often related to close cooperation. For
example, supply chains intend to reduce GHG emissions
from material extraction, transportation, inventory, and
production, etc., through optimizing supply chain opera-
tions and network. Adopting these measures would, in turn,
result in a change in both supply chain GHG emissions and
supply chain risks (see Fig. 1). In particular, those mea-
sures that need inter-organizational cooperation can create
the most emissions saving on one hand, and increase sup-
ply chain vulnerability on the other hand. For instance,
close cooperation with suppliers and customers can reduce
inventory emissions to a great extent while increasing the
probability of occurrence of supply and demand disruption
[6]. Decreasing these risks needs to build the safety stock
and, therefore, would increase emissions from inventory.
Emission management and risk management are interacted
in the context of the supply chain.
In addition, since emission trading is one market-based
policy instrument, subjecting supply chain GHG emissions
to the emission trading would also put companies at risk of
economic loss/earn, emission market variability, and policy
instability. With the increasing trend in the carbon emis-
sions management, risk management has to be extended to
cover issues involved in emissions. To further ensure the
implementation of emission trading in the context of sup-
ply chain, the following work has to be conducted:
1. To construct a framework for supply chain GHG
emissions reduction under emission trading and clarify
the practical implementation, and
2. To identify the risks confronted by companies and
supply chains subject to this system and to classify
them into existing supply chain risk groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2,
it proposes one concept and one framework for supply
chain emission trading and discusses how such a
scheme might be implemented practically. In Sect. 3, it
identifies risks confronted by companies and supply chains
in this system, classifies risks, and provides mitigation
measures. Section 4 gives a conclusion concerning con-
tributions and deficiencies of this work.
2 Including supply chain GHG emissions
into emission trading
2.1 A framework for supply chain emission trading
Literature shows that emission trading might be employed
as one cost-effective instrument for supply chain emissions
reduction. Benjaafar et al. (2012) employs a lot sizing
model to analyze two modes of emission trading coverage
on supply chain. They find that imposing supply chain-
wide emission caps is more cost-effective than individual
cap installation on each firm and it also increases the value
of collaboration [7]. Jin et al. [8] propose the mixed-integer
linear programming to investigate the impact of three
carbon policies on supply chain design. The result shows
that it costs the retailer less under cap-and-trade to signif-
icantly reduce the emission (e.g., by 50 %) compared to the
cSupply chain
cSupply chain GHG emissions reduction under emission trading
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other two policies. Fareeduddin et al. (2015) present one
optimization model based on carbon regulatory policies for
a closed-loop supply chain design. Optimal results show
that cap-and-trade is the most cost-effective one among
others [9]. Zakeri et al. [10] present an analytical supply
chain planning model to examine the supply chain per-
formance under two policy schemes. They find that emis-
sions reduction in a carbon trading scheme follows a
relatively linear trend with a nonlinear cost increase [10].
Carbon trading scheme results in better supply chain per-
formance in terms of emissions generation, cost, and ser-
vice level than carbon pricing. Chaabane et al. [11] provide
a multi-objective mixed-integer linear programming model
to address supply chain design problems and justifies that
emission trading market may be used to reduce the carbon
abatement cost.
The literature is common in presenting mathematical
models to integrate carbon prices explicitly in green supply
chain design and to justify the cost-effectiveness of
applying the emission trading policy into the context of
supply chain [12–17]. This quantitative analysis allows
evaluating impacts of different decision alternatives in
terms of logistics cost and carbon footprint. It also allows
offsetting the impact of GHG reduction through both
supply chain redesign and emission trading. However, none
of them proposes any concept or application-oriented
framework addressing the implementation of emission
trading in the supply chain context. Based on a review of
previous literature, this paper generates one concept—
supply chain emission trading (Fig. 2).
Supply chain emission trading—this concept is extend-
ing emission trading to cover firms in the range of supply
chains. It means, entities covered by emission trading
scheme (ETS) could be not only single firms and installa-
tion, but also supply chains. Supply chain emissions as a
whole are limited to a certain amount (so-called cap).
Permits under this limit are allocated to supply chains for
free, or for certain auction cost. Supply chains have to get
permits equivalent to their accurate GHGs. At the end of a
regulated period, supply chains have to buy emission per-
mits from markets as any other organizations if their
accurate emissions exceed the amount of allocated permits.
Vice versa, supply chains could bank their extra emission
permits for the use of next periods or sell for an earning.
In addition, this paper also conceptualizes one frame-
work for supply chain emission trading (see Fig. 3). This
framework enables companies to understand the steps for
managing their supply chain emissions and implementing
the detailed processes according to given instructions.
Supply chainGHG emissions as awhole are subjected to a
cap due to government regulations. Given an emissions
reduction target, companies have to firstly understand the
carbon footprint of their supply chains. In order to draw the
emission heap map, emission sources should be identified
and measured from operational processes within and beyond
individual companies, facilities, factories and other instal-
lations along the supply chain. For supply chains under
emission trading, they can adopt three measures to meet the
emission reduction targets (see Fig. 4). They are internal
measures (i.e., adopting energy-efficient operations to
reduce emissions within the board of individual company),
inter-organizational measures (i.e., cooperating with sup-
pliers and customers to reduce emissions from inventory,
product manufacturing, and transportation), and external
measures (i.e., trading permits from the emission market).
2.2 Discussion for the practical application
Literature analyzes this concept only from the quantitative
aspect, for example, by justifying the cost-effectiveness of
this concept on supply chain performance. However, there
is a lack of research in the application of this concept. This
paper discusses some practical issues involved and pro-
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1. How is responsibility assigned within the supply
chain?
This concept appoints that supply chain works as a single
company to perform emission abatement measures and to
trade emission permits in current trading markets. Hence,
one actor is responsible for the supply chain GHG emis-
sions. This actor is so-called the focal organization. A focal
company is needed to coordinate actions among supply
chain members, for example, calculating emissions amount
from all supply chain partners, arranging emission abate-
ment alternatives (e.g., technological investment, opera-
tional adjustment), making decisions for emission permits
buy/sell, and negotiating with policy-makers.
2. Who is responsible for the whole supply chain GHG
emissions?
If there are companies, which are already subjected to emis-
sion trading, these companies could be regarded as the focal
organizations responsible for its Scope 3 emissions. Other-
wise, a focal company needs to be assigned. To realize the
implementation of emission trading policy on supply chain
GHG emissions, this paper proposes some practical options to
assign the focal organization among supply chain partners.
• The largest company or the one with the most power
among the supply chain.
• Actor downstream in the supply chain where the goods
are consumed.
Fig. 3 Framework for supply
chain emission trading
Fig. 4 Supply chain emission abatement measures under emission trading. Source: Chaabane et al. [11]
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• Actor upstream in the supply chain where the goods are
produced.
The largest company in the supply chain would probably
pursue green strategies and, therefore, have incentives to
manage supply chain GHG emissions. The one with the most
power affects the actions of other supply chain partners and
the supply chain performance to the most. Hence, they might
be targeted mandatorily as focal companies in the emission
trading policy to manage their supply chain GHG emissions.
Actors downstream in the supply chain are dealing with end
products and are facing to customers. They could have an
overview of supply chain GHG emissions and guide cus-
tomers to choose green products. Assigning these actors as
focal organizations might benefit in managing GHG emis-
sions from the overall supply chain perspective and in
affecting themarket preference aswell.Actors upstream in the
supply chain are always the largest emitters. It might be pos-
sible to save a larger amount of emissions by spending less.
Since emission trading scheme (ETS) is so farmainly targeted
on these actors, it would be one possible way to internalize
their Scope 3 emissions into the cap. By doing this, actors
upstreamare responsible for the supply chainGHGemissions.
3. How to set one supply chain emissions reduction
target?
Literature assumes that it is either voluntary ormandatory for
a supply chain to join emission trading and they analyze
mainly the impact of emission trading policy to supply chain
GHG emissions and cost through quantitative optimization
models. Instead, this paper focuses on the conceptual work
and issues involved in the practical application. Emission
trading scheme is so far enforced to installations over certain
emissions level in some industries in the European Union
(EU), and it is getting implemented in more and more coun-
tries and sectors all over theworld. It is not difficult to imagine
that emission trading would be in the future employed as one
mandatory regulation for supply chain GHG emissions man-
agement. Therefore, this paper hypothesizes an enforcement
of emission trading on a supply chain, which means supply
chain has a mandatory cap, and it is allowed to trade emission
permits in the existingmarkets as same as other organizations.
Besides, this paper proposes a conceptual work by referring to
a general supply chain instead of any specific one.
3 Risk analysis for supply chains under emission
trading
3.1 Risk identification
Risk is generally understood as a negative impact on the
objectives of a company that is associated with
disadvantages, damages, and losses. Risks within the sup-
ply chain are mainly triggered by disruptions of the
material, information or capital flow between the partners
[18]. Kersten et al. (2006) define supply chain risk as fol-
lows. ‘‘Supply chain risk is the damage—assessed by its
probability of occurrence—that is caused by an event
within a company, within its supply chain or its environ-
ment affecting the business processes of at least one
company in the supply chain negatively’’ [19]. The task of
supply chain risk management is ‘‘a collaborative and
structured approach to risk management, embedded in the
planning and control processes of the supply chain, to
handle risks that might adversely affect the achievement of
supply chain goals’’ [20].
Literature addressing supply chain emission trading in
operational research points out that supply chain collabo-
ration is one of the biggest risks to realize the implemen-
tation [7]. Employing emission trading in the whole supply
chain would result in cost-effectiveness as well as cost shift
among supply chain partners. How to distribute the spared
cost to supply chain partners is the key to get supply chain
partners collaborated. Besides, emission trading is a polit-
ically established market-based instrument to reduce
GHGs. Applying emission trading on the range of supply
chain is subject to potential risks not only from market
variation, but also from political interventions as well [21].
Considering potential damages, losses, and disadvan-
tages of emission trading’s exploration on supply chain
firms, this paper suggests a risk portfolio and expands risks
identified already in the literature (see in Fig. 5).
1. Agreement risks (responsibility allocation dispute)
By including supply chains into emission trading, supply
chain partners work together as a single firm. Different
supply chain partners have different emission abatement
marginal costs. Their goal is to reduce supply chain
emissions as a whole at the minimal cost. To meet this
goal, emission reduction cost might be transferred from one
company to another where companies who are more cost-
effective in emissions reduction would reduce more. Since
there is an extra benefit from supply chain integration, it
might be allocated to each supply chain firm as compen-
sation. In this situation, there are risks when compensation
methods are unfair or not satisfied for all inclusive supply
chain firms [7]. Supply chain partners might terminate
contracts with others due to increasing emissions cost or
low interest in emissions reduction. Therefore, supply
chains under emission trading are more vulnerable to
supply chain instability than normal supply chains.
2. Green investment risks (green investment uncertainty)
One of the main alternatives for supply chain firms under
the emission trading is to adopt green investment (also
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called abatement measures). Green investment refers to
adopting actions and resources for saving energy and eco-
friendly transportation, which includes technological effi-
ciency improvement and operational efficiency improve-
ment. For example, companies could optimize their supply
chains in order to save emissions from inventory, produc-
tion, and transportation. However, such behavior is going
to intensify the supply chain risks brought by supply chain
inter-dependence. Furthermore, compared to permits’ pur-
chasing, green investment is a proactive measure as it has a
long-term and sustainable effect on supply chain firms’
performance, moving toward the goal of reducing GHG
emissions [22]. Some abatement measures provide extre-
mely high cost, while some provide revenue rather than
cost. Firms have to decide which abatement measures
should be adopted to reduce internal emissions according
to their economic and operational performance, but the
long-term cost and benefit of the implementation is
unpredictable. In addition to usual risks, companies are
also confronted with risks resulted by inappropriate
investment in green technologies and other green practices.
3. Volume risks (emissions accounting failure)
Supply chain companies need to submit equivalent permits
at the end of each year to cover all of their accurate
emissions. However, it is not possible to pre-estimate
supply chain emissions accurately before going through
this year. Companies buy and sell permits from time to
time according to the price change in the market. Inaccu-
rate forecast of supply chain emissions could result in
overstock or shortage of permits [21]. Each permit stands
for cost and revenue for companies, and overstock or
shortage of permits would possibly bring economic losses
for companies.
4. Market risks (trading market instability)
The price of permits is theoretically decided by demand
and supply in the market. Such a market competition sys-
tem enables the high market volatility on one hand but it
results in uncertainty in permits’ price on the other hand.
The EU ETS, so far the largest ETS around the world, has
gone through starting phases from 2005 to 2007 as the first,
and from 2008 to 2012 as the second. In the first phase, the
price of permits in the EU market is almost zero due to the
oversupply of permits allocation to firms [23]. And the low
price in the second phase is largely attributed to declining
economic activity levels after the big economic crisis in
2007 [24]. As a result, the uncertainty of permits’ price
brings the risk of an unpredictable cost incurred by emis-
sion trading.
5. Policy risks (trading policy uncertainty)
Emission trading is a politically established market-based
instrument to reduce emissions of GHGs and others. And
therefore, it is subjected to any policy change and gov-
ernment decisions, such as the cap-setting and allocation
Fig. 5 Risk sources and identification for supply chains under emission trading
10 Page 6 of 10 Logist. Res. (2016) 9:10
123
plan [21]. Although more and more countries are imple-
menting or plan to implement ETS, it is so far still in an
infant stage. Policies change from time to time according to
the first-hand experiences attained in practice. The EU ETS
sets free allocation for all emission permits in the first
phase and the proportion of free allocation is getting
smaller in the later phases. Different allocation methods
and the combination of them are put into practice. For
example, only electricity generators can get some propor-
tion of free allocation in the third phase while other
industrial manufacturers have to auction for permits that
they need [5]. Such policies’ change put companies at the
risk of the unstable cost burden.
3.2 Risk categorization
Supply chain risks can be categorized in many different
ways and from different perspectives. One possible way is
the classification of supply chain risks into two types:
operational risk and disruption risk [25–27]. Operational
risk is defined as ‘‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate
or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from
external events’’ [25]. Examples of operational risks are
quality, delivery or service problems [27]. Disruption risk
is referred to natural or manmade disasters such as terrorist
attacks, sociopolitical instability, strikes, earthquakes,
hurricanes and floods [26, 27].
Another way is to identify sources of risks within the three
areas: company, supply chain, and environment (see Fig. 6).
Internal risks within a company include process risks (i.e.,
disruption of the production processes) and control risks (i.e.,
management failure or inflexible decision rules). Supply and
demand risks are disruptions of the material, information or
capital flowbetween suppliers and customers [6].All potential
damage causedby sociopolitical,macroeconomic or technical
changes are represented by environmental risks [18].
Based on the concept of supply chain risks, this paper
classified these risks into each group of supply chain risks
according to the distribution of risk sources (see Fig. 7).
Supply chains under emission trading are exposed to
additional risks. Being subject to the cap-and-trade, supply
chains are confronted with risks from both policy and
market perspective. By committing to reduce emissions
under the cap, supply chain firms encounter new risks of
green investment uncertainty and emissions accounting
failure. Accounting failure would result also in surrender-
ing not enough permits at the end of a certain period. In
addition, supply chain firms must be exposed to the risk of
responsibility allocation dispute when assigning the emis-
sions reduction responsibility among supply chain partners.
This risk is also raised by distributing the spared cost or
extra benefit to supply chain partners.
3.3 Strategies for risk mitigation
The implementation of emission trading on supply chain
would not only intensify some risks for supply chain
companies but also increase some additionally. All these
risks could be regarded as disadvantages in including
supply chains into emission trading from business and
political point of view. They take essential roles in pro-
moting supply chain firms reducing emissions and collab-
orating with each other. These risks are also what
government should focus on when they are considering
employing emission trading on supply chains. Although
this paper is limited in conducting the risk assessment,
authors contribute still in providing some risk mitigation
measures for both policy-makers and business companies.
(a) To engage supply chain into emission trading based
on leading firms in each supply chain. Leading firms
are powerful to encourage supply chain partners to
collaborate in reducing emissions together. And
leading firms could also set emission reduction
targets for other partners due to its large power and
business attractiveness. Therefore, leading firms
could be targeted as main subjects in the first step
of including supply chains.
(b) To learn experiences from existing ETS to set the
supply chain emission limit so called cap. The cap
could either be drafted by firms and permitted by
governments or directly issued by governments.
Permits could be allocated to supply chain partners
according to the method ‘benchmark’ which benefits
green firms and punishes others.
Fig. 6 Sources of risk within a
supply chain. Source: Kersten
et al. [19]
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(c) To jointly regulate permits price by market system
and governmental intervention at the beginning. Too
high or too low price would prohibit the goal of
supply chain emission reduction. Proper intervention
from the government is necessary to keep the price
fluctuate in a reasonable range.
(d) To clarify benefits and costs of green technologies
through official third parties. Professional parties
have experiences and experts to verify emission
savings and costs of main green technologies, and
these parties could be connected to the department of
permits verification in existing ETS.
(e) To import offset/credit concepts within the range of
supply chain. It means, the leading company in the
supply chain could get credits by investing into
emissions reduction projects within the board of
other supply chain firms. These credits could be used
as additional permits in the existing emission trading
market. Credit projects could also be invested by
other supply chain firms and sold to the leading
companies at a certain price.
(f) To add agreements in business contracts among
supply chain partners concerning cost/benefits allo-
cation. There are many kinds of contracts that could
compensate the loss of firms induced by emission
trading, such as product price discount, operational
contract extension, and so on. It would also offer
mind share to refer to some quantitative models in
operational research.
4 Conclusion
It is well recognized that in order to combat climate
change, GHG emissions need to be managed from the
supply chain perspective. This paper moves one more step
forward on the base of literature by introducing one con-
cept—supply chain emission trading and one framework in
addressing emission trading in the context of supply chains.
To implement the supply chain emission trading, this paper
proposed to assign the responsibility of supply chain GHG
emissions to the focal company in the supply chain by
including the scope 3 emissions of the focal company into
ETS. Moreover, this paper discerns itself from others by
identifying risks for supply chains under emission trading
program. From a corporate perspective, these risks are
from policy instability, market variation, supply chain
agreement dispute, green investment uncertainty, and
supply chain GHG emission accounting failure. Moreover,
based on the concept of supply chain risks, this paper
attributes green investment risks to internal and external
risks, policy and market risks to supply chain environ-
mental risks, accounting risks to internal risks, and agree-
ment risks to external risks.
The concept proposed in this paper lays the foundation
for future research to address further qualitative issues
involved in employing emission trading in the context of
supply chain, such as analyzing the challenges and
opportunities within the implementation processes.
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Fig. 7 Risk categorization for supply chains under emission trading
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steps and instructions provided in the framework when they
are considering leveraging the opportunities offered by
emission trading to manage their supply chain GHG
emissions. Furthermore, having an overview of companies’
risks provides mind share for policy-makers before they
start implementing emission trading in the context of
supply chain. For example, they could make efforts to
decrease the accounting failure risk by importing one
unified supply chain GHG emission measurement tool or
standard. Last but not least, this paper contributes in con-
necting supply chain risk management and supply chain
emissions management through classifying identified risks
into each group of supply chain risks. By doing so, it makes
the resources and experiences in the area of supply chain
risk management accessible to facilitate the implementa-
tion of supply chain emission trading, and paves the way
for future research in risks assessment and evaluation.
However, this paper is just a first step towards realizing
the employment of emission trading in the context of
supply chain and it has limitations. The supply chain
emission trading proposed in this paper works on the base
that there exists a focal company in the supply chain.
Nevertheless, it doesn’t apply to supply chains that are
composed by many small and equally powerful companies.
Future research might consider conducting an analysis of
challenges and opportunities involved in the implementation
processes. For instance, the Monitor, Review, and Verify
(MRV) system of ETS has to be extended to adapt for the
supply chain scale in supply chain emission trading. In
addition, it is worthy to explore other mechanisms to realize
supply chain emission trading concerning different supply
chain organizational structures. As suggested in this paper,
supply chain credit scheme that incorporates the concept of
credit/offset into the supply chain emission trading would
provide flexibility. Furthermore, it is interesting to assess and
evaluate those identified risks and investigate how they
interact with the existing supply chain risk portfolio.
Acknowledgments Authors appreciate reviewers for providing con-
structive comments on this paper. Besides, this paper is supported by
Research Grants for Doctoral Candidates and Young Academics and
Scientists from Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
1. Huang YA, Weber CL, Matthews HS (2009) Categorization of
scope 3 emission for streamlined enterprise carbon footprinting.
Environ Sci Technol 43(22):8509–8515
2. EPA (2010) Managing supply chain Greenhouse Gas emissions—
lessons learned for the road ahead. http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-07/documents/managing_supplychain_ghg.
pdf. Accessed 5 Nov 2015
3. Gupta S, Palsule-Desai OD (2011) Sustainable SC management:
review and research opportunities. IIMB Manag Rev
23(4):234–245
4. Long TB, Young W (2015) An exploration of intervention
options to enhance the management of SC greenhouse gas
emission in the UK. J Clean Prod. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.02.
074
5. European Commission (EC) (2013) http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/index_en.htm. Accessed 5 Nov 2015
6. Ju¨ttner U (2005) Supply chain risk management: understanding
the business requirements from a practitioner perspective. Int J
Logist Manag 16(1):120–141
7. Benjaafar S, Li Y, Daskin M (2013) Carbon footprint and the
management of SCs: insights from simple models. IEEE Trans
Autom Sci Eng 10(1):99–116
8. Jin M, Granda-Marulanda NA, Down I (2014) The impact of
carbon policies on SC design and logistics of a major retailer.
J Clean Prod 85:453–461
9. Fareeduddin M, Hassan A, Syed MN, Selim SZ (2015) The
impact of carbon policies on closed-loop supply chain network
design. Proc CIRP 26:335–340
10. Zakeri A, Dehghanian F, Fahimnia B, Sarkis J (2015) Carbon
pricing versus emissions trading: a supply chain planning per-
spective. Int J Prod Econ 164:197–205
11. Chaabane A, Ramudhin A, Paquet M (2011) Designing SCs with
sustainability considerations. Prod Plan Control 22(8):727–741
12. Jaber MY, Glock CH, El Saadany AM (2013) SC coordination
with emission reduction incentives. Int J Prod Res 51(1):69–82
13. Diabat A, Simchi-Levi D (2009) A carbon-capped SC network
problem. In: Industrial engineering and engineering management,
2009. IEEM 2009. IEEE international conference on. IEEE,
pp 523–527
14. Drake D, Kleindorfer PR, Van Wassenhove LN (2010) Tech-
nology choice and capacity investment under emissions regula-
tion. Fac Res 93(10):128–145
15. Abdallah T, Farhat A, Diabat A, Kennedy S (2012) Green supply
chains with carbon trading and environmental sourcing: formu-
lation and life cycle assessment. Appl Quant Model
36(9):4271–4285
16. Ramudhin A, Chaabane A, Kharoune M, Paquet M (2008) Car-
bon market sensitive green SC network design. In: Industrial
engineering and engineering management, 2008. IEEM 2008.
IEEE international conference on. IEEE, pp 1093–1097
17. Fahimnia B, Sarkis J, Dehghanian F, Banihashemi N, Rahman S
(2013) The impact of carbon pricing on a closed-loop SC: an
Australian case study. J Clean Prod 59:210–225
18. Christopher M (2005) Logistics and supply chain management:
creating value-added networks. Prentice Hall, Financial Times,
Harlow, pp 13–14
19. Kersten W, Bo¨ger M, Hohrath P, Spa¨th H (2006) Supply chain
risk management: development of a theoretical and empirical
framework. In: Kersten W, Blecker T (eds) Managing risks in
supply chains: how to build reliable collaboration in logistics.
Schmidt, Berlin, pp 3–18
20. Kaju¨ter P (2003) Risk management in supply chains. In:
Seuring S, Mu¨ller M, Goldbach M, Schneidewind U (eds)
Strategy and organization in supply chains. Physica, Heidel-
berg, pp 321–336
21. Spangardt G, Meyer J (2005) Risikomanagement im Emission-
shandel. In: Lucht M, Spangardt G (eds) Emissionshandel.
O¨konomische Prinzipien, rechtliche Regelungen und technische
Lo¨sungen fu¨r den Klimaschutz. Springer, Berlin, pp 219–232
Logist. Res. (2016) 9:10 Page 9 of 10 10
123
22. Sheu JB, Li F (2013) Market competition and greening trans-
portation of airlines under the emission trading scheme: a case of
duopoly market. Transp Sci 48(4):684–694
23. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) International
convergence of capital measurements and capital standards (a
revised framework). Press and Communications, Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, Basel
24. Brunner S, Flachsland C, Luderer G, Edenhofer O (2009)
Emissions trading systems: an overview. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.
edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.535.2125&rep=rep1&type=
pdf. Accessed 5 Nov 2015
25. Kleindorfer PR, Saad GH (2005) Managing disruption risks in
supply chains. Prod Oper Manag 14(1):53–68
26. Tang CS (2006) Perspectives in supply chain risk management.
Int J Prod Econ 103(2):451–488
27. Lockamy A, McCormack K (2010) Analyzing risks in supply
networks to facilitate outsourcing decision. Int J Prod Res
48(2):593–611
10 Page 10 of 10 Logist. Res. (2016) 9:10
123
